

# Randomized Program Evaluation: A Microfinance Experiment in Ghana

Kampala RPC Workshop, Day 2

January 29, 2008

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# Motivation


Policy motivation:

Donors are pouring large sums into microfinance;  
We should stop to ask what it's accomplishing.

- Globally: More than US\$ 1 billion is committed annually to microfinance programs (CGAP 2005)
- Ghana: Sept. 2006 President Kufuor inaugurated a new US\$ 50 million Micro-Credit and Small Loans Scheme which will make loans of between US\$ 100 and US\$2,000 with zero collateral requirements.

# Questions

- Incidence**            Who wants credit/who gets it?
- Impact**                What is the causal impact of program participation on business profits, food security and, ultimately, child height/weight?
- Investment vs. Insurance**    Credit may serve a variety of functions.  
What does microfinance finance?



# The 'Credit with Education' Program (CWE)

Run & financed by a partnership between two organizations:

- **Freedom from Hunger.** U.S. based NGO provides technical assistance, and helps secure subsidized finance from donors (UNICEF, etc.).
- **Lower Pra Rural Bank.** Staffs and implements the project, retains all profits.

Two-pronged intervention, targeted exclusively at women but no other means testing/minimum requirements dictated by the project.


- **Credit.** Small loans (up to roughly \$300) intended to finance income-generating activities.
- **Education.** Curriculum focuses on three areas: health and nutrition, business skills, and management of the Credit Association itself. Roughly 1 hr per week, during CA meetings.

# Anthropometrics & Welfare

Two anthropometric measures employed here:

**Wasting** = low weight-for-height, a.k.a acute malnutrition, as it generally reflects short term calorie deprivation

**Stunting** = low height-for-age, a.k.a chronic malnutrition, due to a deficiency of micronutrients (often not found in inexpensive staples).



## The Experimental Design



## Village level randomization

- 11 program villages eligible for treatment from 1993 - '96.
- 6 control villages eligible only after 1996.
- Stratified by size & distance from main road (4 cells)
- All women in treatment villages invited to join program. 23% accepted.

## Departures from pure randomization:

- In four villages, ex ante political considerations guided assignment.
- In one randomly assigned treatment village, there was insufficient demand to open a Credit Association. Whole stratification dropped (bringing total from 19 to 17).

Due to interest in child nutrition, survey sampled **exclusively mothers** with infants.

### Baseline Survey, August 1993


- Conducted before program was launched, spanning program & control villages.
- Random sample of women with children 12 - 24 months (extended to 36 in follow-up).
- 308 respondents = average of 18.1 per village.
- Follow-up information on whether individuals joined the program.

### Follow-up Survey, August 1996


- 306 respondents - **not a panel of individuals**.
- Deliberate over-sampling of participants.

### Sample Sizes - Mother/Child Pairs

Baseline Survey, 1993



Follow-up Survey, 1996



Graphs by round

Table: Sample Size by Community

Program Communities	Sample of Mothers				Population of Clients in 1996 (Mothers/Non)
	1993		1996		
	Future Clients	Non-Clients	Clients	Non-Clients	
Aboso	4	6	7	8	35
Anto	10	21	17	17	51
Assorku	3	26	8	10	60
Atwereboanda	3	7	1	7	30
Beposo	9	20	10	9	28
Essaman	5	25	4	8	32
Nyankrom	0	10	2	7	25
Obinyim Okyena	3	7	7	10	28
Old Daboase Junction	3	7	7	8	27
Shama Junction	6	24	20	19	93
Yabiw	2	8	7	9	34
<i>Sub-Total</i>	<i>48</i>	<i>161</i>	<i>90</i>	<i>112</i>	<i>443</i>

Table: Sample Size by Community

	Sample of Mothers				Population of Clients in 1996 (Mothers/Non)
	1993		1996		
	Future Clients	Non- Clients	Clients	Non- Clients	
<b>Control Communities</b>					
Asem Asa	.	10	.	10	.
Bokokope	.	9	.	10	.
Daboase	.	30	.	33	.
Kobino Ano Krom	.	10	.	11	.
Kumase	.	30	.	30	.
Nkwantakese	.	10	.	10	.
<i>Sub-Total</i>	.	<i>99</i>	.	<i>104</i>	.
<i>Grand Total, 614</i>	.	<i>260</i>	.	<i>216</i>	.

# Survey Data

Household Enterprises	{	“Profits”:	Self-reported, before deducting interest payments & own earnings
		Net Income:	Revenue minus costs
		Capital:	Value of assets used for business

Nutrition	{	Anthropometrics:	HAZ and WHZ scores
		'Lean' months	Months in which household had difficulty finding enough food.
		Food expenditure:	NB: expenditure not consumption.

Table: Baseline Summary Statistics, 1993

	Control Villages (1)	Program Villages (2)	Testing Randomization (3)
HAZ	-.966 (1.147)	-1.270 (1.173)	-.304 (.139)**
WHZ	-.927 (1.031)	-.703 (1.138)	.224 (.130)*
'Lean' Months	1.821 (2.296)	1.912 (2.514)	.090 (.309)
Food Expenditure	12164.3 (7991.3)	11323.3 (8421.0)	-841.0 (1098.7)
Profit	7322.7 (29151.8)	6391.4 (10205.6)	-931.2 (1264.5)
Net Income	8341.2 (45807.4)	6195.4 (12156.4)	-2145.8 (1684.5)
Capital	32621.0 (76862.3)	21952.7 (42467.8)	-10668.3 (9070.0)

All monetary values are in real 1995 Ghanaian Cedis.


# Incidence

(a.k.a., Who Gets Credit?)




## Sample Sizes - Mother/Child Pairs

Baseline Survey, 1993




Follow-up Survey, 1996



Graphs by round

## Mothers' Economic Activities: Program Communities Only - '93



Graphs by participation



Table: Loan Take-Up

	Probit for Participation		Regression of Loan Size	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Palm Oil	-.514 (.341)	-.883 (.411)**	-.067 (.168)	-.064 (.174)
Bakery/Prepared Food	.602*** (.217)***	.453 (.250)*	.073 (.134)	.047 (.143)
Smoked Fish	.859*** (.307)***	1.003 (.329)***	.109 (.189)	.120 (.192)
Profits		-.00002 (.00004)		
Profits <sup>2</sup>		3.71e-11 (1.04e-09)		
Capital		.00002 (9.96e-06)**		
Capital <sup>2</sup>		-1.01e-10 (5.49e-11)*		
Own Land Dummy		-.278 (.231)		-.024 (.159)
Age		.037 (.016)**		.006 (.010)
Schooling		.049 (.027)*		.017 (.015)
Obs.	200	200	83	83

Table: Probits for Selection on Outcome Measures

Nutrition Outcomes		Business Outcomes	
HAZ	.033 (.082)	Log Net Income	.259 (.141)*
WHZ	.139 (.084)*	Log Profit	.214 (.137)
Log Food Exp.	.043 (.169)	Log Capital	.174 (.108)
Log Meat Exp.	.061 (.136)	Net Income	7.14e-06 (7.52e-06)
'Lean' Months	.032 (.038)	Profit	1.00e-05 (8.88e-06)
Breast Feeding Dummy	.078 (.213)	Capital	2.80e-06 (2.09e-06)
Diarrhea Knowledge	.508 (.317)		

Each coefficient corresponds to a separate equation.

## Impacts

# Treatment Effects

Let  $Y_i^T$  be the 'potential outcome' for individual  $i$  if treated, and  $Y_i^C$  otherwise. Our goal is to compute the causal impact of treatment  $T$  on the outcome  $Y$ .

$$\beta_i = Y_i^T - Y_i^C$$

Or more realistically, the average treatment effect for some subset of the population,  $E[\beta_i | T]$ . The problem of selection bias is that

$$E[\beta_i | T] = E[Y^T | T] - E[Y^C | C]$$

iff  $E[Y_i^C | T] = E[Y_i^C | C]$ .

## Suggestion Designs & Partial Compliance

Partial compliance:

- Assignment to the treatment group does not guarantee treatment.
- Nor, in principle, does random assignment to the control group guarantee non-participation.

Suggestion Designs:

- Treatment group is invited or encouraged to participate.
- In our case, the vast majority of women in program communities opted not to participate in the program.
- Presumption that participation is (positively) correlated with the treatment effect.



# Intention-to-Treat Effect (ITT)

The ITT is computed as the mean difference between program and control communities:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{I.T.T.} &= E[Y_i|Z = 1] - E[Y_i|Z = 0] \\ &\neq E[\beta_i|T] \end{aligned}$$

- Measures the average, causal effect of the program on all eligible women.
- Note, this is distinct from the Average Treatment Effect (ATE).
- Often particularly relevant for policy analysis.

# Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE)

Suppose we're willing to assume that there are no externalities in the program.

- Then, the ITT must be driven entirely by the participants.
- Thus the **effect of treatment on the treated** is computed as the ratio of the ITT to the proportion of treated individuals in the treatment group.

$$LATE = E[\beta_i | T] = \frac{E[Y_i | Z = 1] - E[Y_i | Z = 0]}{E[T_i | Z = 1] - E[T_i | Z = 0]}$$

- Wald estimator, equivalent to the **instrumental variables** estimate of  $\beta$ , using the randomization as the instrument.

# Econometric Specification

To compute the ITT, we can estimate the following equation

$$Y_{ijt} = \alpha Z_{jt} + \mu_j + \nu_{jt} + \epsilon_{ijt}$$

Even if randomization was imperfect:

$$\begin{aligned} E[Z_{jt}\mu_j] &\neq 0 && \text{but we can include village FEs} \\ E[Z_{jt}\nu_{jt}] &\neq 0 && \text{this is a problem} \\ E[Z_{jt}\epsilon_{ijt}] &= 0 && \text{as } Z \text{ doesn't vary within } j \end{aligned}$$

# Econometric Specification


To estimate the LATE, consider the following econometric model


$$\begin{aligned} Y_{ijt} &= \beta_T T_{ijt} + \beta_X X_{1ijt} + \mu_j + \nu_{jt} + \eta_{ijt} \\ T_{ijt} &= \gamma_Z Z_{jt} + \gamma_X X_{2ijt} + \delta_{ijt} \end{aligned}$$


where, even allowing that  $X_2 \subseteq X_1$ ,  $Z$  serves as a valid instrument for treatment.

Note however that we cannot exploit within-village variation in  $T$ :

- Use binary  $Z$  to instrument for binary  $T$  as well as loan size.
- Use introduction of program in village  $j$  as instrument for duration of treatment.












Table: Reduced-Form Impact on Income-Generating Activities

		$\hat{\beta}_T^{OLS}$ (Naive)	$\hat{\beta}_Z^{OLS}$ (ITT)	$\hat{\beta}_T^{IV}$ (LATE)
		(1)	(2)	(3)
Log Net Income	N=374	.295 (.179)*	.428 (.110)***	1.116 (.291)***
Log Profit	N=393	.531 (.179)***	.352 (.161)**	.934 (.419)**
Log Capital	N=352	.247 (.213)	.147 (.233)	.366 (.580)
Net Income	N=596	23444.570 (7732.627)***	5700.105 (4105.434)	24693.700 (16680.380)
Profit	N=609	23079.200 (5239.549)***	6145.467 (4432.011)	26695.750 (17941.180)
Capital	N=607	17792.370 (5572.376)***	11136.150 (10544.560)	49662.910 (45790.750)

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
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
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
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In 1996, average loan size was 76,245 Cedis ( $\approx$  \$50) at 48% annual interest. This would imply a monthly loan payment of approximately 22,111 Cedis ( $\approx$  \$16).

	Log Net Income	Log Profits	Abs. Net Income.	Abs. Profits
$\hat{\pi}^T$	72,647	48,001	52,070	45,541
$\hat{\pi}^C$	23,808	18,867	27,376	18,845
$(\hat{\pi}^T - \hat{\pi}^C)/\bar{L}$	64.1%	38.2%	32.4%	35.0%
$(\hat{\pi}^T - \hat{\pi}^C - P)/\bar{L}$	35.1%	9.2%	3.4%	6.0%












Table: Reduced-Form Impact on Nutrition Related Outcomes

		$\hat{\beta}_T^{OLS}$ (Naive)	$\hat{\beta}_Z^{OLS}$ (ITT)	$\hat{\beta}_T^{IV}$ (LATE)
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HAZ	N=605	.321 (.158)**	.082 (.189)	.358 (.816)
WHZ	N=605	.097 (.140)	-.195 (.185)	-.847 (.818)
Log Food Exp.	N=595	-.163 (.075)**	.109 (.075)	.458 (.323)
Log Meat Exp.	N=576	.051 (.079)	.093 (.178)	.421 (.808)
'Lean' Months	N=601	-.763 (.250)***	-.538 (.300)*	-2.325 (1.342)*
Breast Feeding Dummy	N=614	-.010 (.053)	.064 (.084)	.280 (.367)
Diarrhea Knowledge	N=614	.257 (.048)***	.113 (.034)***	.493 (.139)***

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## Conclusions

# Conclusions

## Incidence

- 'Positive' selection into the program
- Age, schooling, education, income, capital all increase probability of participation

## Impact

- Glass half full: positive effects on HAZ - no significant evidence these are driven by selection.
- Glass half empty: after controlling for selection, no significant HAZ impacts.

## Investment vs. Insurance

- Impacts on profits are quite large, although may not reflect consumption changes if borrowers substitute away from farming.
- Impacts on 'hungry season' and height consistent with, though hardly proof of, improved ability to smooth.